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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Corporal Punishment in Schools - Due Process
Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Ingraham v. Wright, 97 S. Ct. 1401 (1977).
C ORPORAL PUNISHMENT as a means of disciplining school children has
been used in this country since colonial days.' There have been various
constitutional attacks on the practice of inflicting corporal punishment,
with varying results, and the issue was finally brought before the Supreme
Court in Ingraham v. Wright.' The Court decided on April 19, 1977 that the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the eighth amendment does not
apply to disciplinary corporal punishment in public schools' and that the
Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment does not require notice
and hearing prior to imposition of corporal punishment, as that practice is
authorized and limited by the common law.'
The parents of James Ingraham and Roosevelt Andrews, two public
junior high school students, filed a complaint in the United States District
Court for the District of Florida.' The students had been corporally punished
by school officials for various acts of misbehavior. The three count complaint
consisted of two individual damage actions based on the paddlingse and the
third was a class action for declaratory and injunctive relief filed on behalf
of all students in Dade County Schools. All such actions were brought under
42 U.S.C. § 1983." Plaintiffs claimed that such punishment violated the
eighth amendment right as to cruel and unusual punishment, and that the
I Ingraham v. Wright, 97 S. Ct. 1401, 1407 (1977). See H. FALK, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT
11-48 (1941). See generally note 27 infra.
2 97 S. Ct. 1401.
3 Id. at 1408-12.
4 1d. at 1413-18.
5 Id. at 1403.
6 Ingraham was subjected to more than 20 licks with a paddle while being held over a table
in the principal's office and his injuries consisted of painful bruises which caused him to
miss eleven days of school. Andrews was punished for minor infractions and on two occasions
he was struck on his arms, one depriving him of the use of his arm for a week. Id. at 1405.
742 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress.
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practice of corporal punishment, authorized by Florida statute,' deprived
them of liberty without procedural and substantive due process of law.
The district court granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict at
the end of plaintiff's case, deciding that plaintiff's constitutional rights had
not been violated.9 The court of appeals in an en banc opinion affirmed 0
and the Supreme Court granted certiorari."
Historically, the use of corporal punishment by teachers was based on
the theory of in loco parentis, wherein the teacher's authority was defined as
"a partial delegation of parental authority."' 2 The theory was that the teacher
stood in the place of the parent and therefore had the right to use reasonable
corporal punishment to enforce discipline. Although this theory supports
the common law privilege granted to teachers to use reasonable physical
punishment to enforce discipline, such a privilege can no longer be defended
on this ground. As long as a consensual relationship existed between parents
and teachers, as when children attended small private schools, the parent
could control the discipline his child received; but in modem times when
education is compulsory, it is questionable whether parents actually do dele-
gate their authority to control their child's discipline.13
In response to current educational practices is the theory that corporal
punishment is justified by the state's right to impose any corporal punishment
reasonably necessary for the proper education of the child and for the main-
tenance of group discipline."' In determining what punishment is reasonable,
it is necessary to consider various factors, such as the nature and seriousness
of the offense, the severity of the punishment, the age of the child, and the
possibility of an equally effective, but nonphysical means of discipline.
Since the teacher is responsible for maintaining discipline and order in the
8The statute in effect in the 1970-71 school year was FLA. STAT. ANN. § 232.27 (1977),
which read as follows:
Each teacher or other member of the staff of any school shall assume such authority
for the control of pupils as may be assigned to him by the principal and shall keep
good order in the classroom and in other places in which he is assigned to be in charge
of pupils, but he shall not inflict corporal punishment before consulting the principal
or teacher in charge of pupils, and in no case shall such punishment be degrading or
unduly severe in its nature.
In 1976, the statute was amended to spell out specific procedural safeguards. 97 S. Ct.
1404 n.6.
9 Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 425 U.S. 990 (1976),
aff'd 97 S. Ct. 1401 (1977).
10 525 F.2d 909.
11 425 U.S. 990 (1976).
12 See Note, 26 BAYLOR L. REv. 678 (1974).
Is Id. at 679.
14F. HARPER AND F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 292 (1956).
"I Id. at 290-91.
(Vol. 11:2
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school, he needs power to enforce his lawful commands, and for this reason,
he may, when necessary, use physical punishment on students who do not
obey."6 The Restatement of Torts states:
One other than a parent who has been given by law or has vol-
untarily assumed in whole or in part the function of controlling,
training, or educating a child, is privileged to apply such reasonable
force or to impose such reasonable confinement as he reasonably believes
to be necessary for its proper control, training, or education, except
insofar as the parent has restricted the privilege of one to whom he
has entrusted the child. 7
This authority of the teacher extends to all offenses which directly and
immediately affect the "decorum and morale of the school... [and] extends
to the infliction of any corporal punishment . . . reasonable under the cir-
cumstances."18
Ohio, which has consistently supported the rule that a school teacher
may use corporal punishment so long as he uses no greater force than is
necessary, 9 follows the principle expounded in the North Carolina case of
State v. Pendergrass.2" Pendergrass grants the teacher complete discretion
as to the need and nature of punishment so long as the punishment does not
cause lasting injury and is not inflicted maliciously.2' The more modem view,
however, bases the authority of the teacher on the concept that the state's
interest in maintaining group discipline and providing a proper education
for the child is paramount.22 Nevertheless, in most states, an educator using
excessive or unreasonable force is subject to civil and criminal liability.22
Thus the common law does not proscribe corporal punishment per se"
so that parents and students who want to challenge the system must find
other grounds on which to base their attacks. In recent years, these attacks
have involved claiming a violation of the student's constitutional rights
under the cruel and unusual punishment provision of the eighth amendment
and the procedural and substantive due process provisions of the fourteenth
amendment.21 The cases can be categorized in three groups: the first in-
10 Sims v. Waln, 388 F. Supp. 543, 547 (S.D. Ohio 1974).
17 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 147 (2) (1963).
18W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 27 (4th ed. 1971).
'" 388 F. Supp. at 548.
20 19 N.C. 365, 31 Am. Dec. 416 (1837).
21 Ripps, The Tort Liability of the Classroom Teacher, 9 AKRON L. REV. 19, 22 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Ripps].
22 F. HARPER AND F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 292 (1956).
2 3 Proehl, Tort Liability of Teachers, 12 VAND. L. REv. 723, 726 (1959).
24 388 F. Supp. at 548.
28 id.
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volves the situation where the eighth amendment was held to apply to corporal
punishment in the public schools;26 the second group is the situation where
it was held not to apply; 7 and the third group consists of those cases in which
the eighth amendment might apply, had the punishment involved in the
cases been deemed to meet the requirements of being cruel and unusual. 8
In Bramlett v. Wilson," a mother brought an action on behalf of three
minor children under 42 U.S.C. § 1983," alleging that the superintendent
of the public schools which the children were compelled to attend had
violated their constitutional rights guaranteed by the eighth and fourteenth
amendments of the Constitution. The district court granted defendant's
motion to dismiss on the grounds of failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted; but the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
and remanded on the ground that corporal punishment "in some circum-
stances might constitute cruel and unusual punishment."'" The court did
not decide whether it was cruel and unusual punishment per se, but said
"[i]t is sufficient that an excessive amount of physical punishment could be
held to be cruel and unusual and therefore prohibited."3
Concerning the second group of cases, the eighth amendment was held
not to apply in Sims v. Wain" which involved a fifteen year old junior high
school student. The plaintiff sought damages and an injunction against
defendants to prevent discrimination against the plaintiff or other black
persons in the infliction of corporal punishment, and the plaintiff also sought
a declaratory judgment holding the Ohio statute unconstitutional. The statute
in question allowed reasonable corporal punishment to be inflicted by a
teacher or a principal upon a pupil when it was reasonably necessary to
preserve discipline."4 The court held that corporal punishment as such was
not contrary to general principles of accepted law; the Ohio statute was
26 Bramlett v. Wilson, 495 F.2d 714 (8th Cir. 1974).
27 Sims v. Waln, 388 F. Supp. 543 (S.D. Ohio 1974); Gonway v. Gray, 361 F. Supp. 366
(D. Vt. 1973). Cf. Roberts v. Way, 398 F. Supp. 856 (D. Vt. 1975).
28 Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C.), afId without comment, 423 U.S. 907
(1975); Glaser v. Marietta, 351 F. Supp. 555 (W.D. Pa. 1972); Ware v. Estes, 328 F. Supp.
657 (N.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 458 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir. 1972); Sims v. Board of
Education, 329 F. Supp. 678 (D.N.M. 1971).
29 495 F.2d 714 (8th Cir. 1974).
30 Supra note 7.
31 495 F.2d at 717.
82 Id.
33 388 F. Supp. 543 (S.D. Ohio 1974).
34 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3319.41 (Page 1972) states that:
A person employed or engaged as a teacher, principal, or administrator in a school,
whether public or private, may inflict or cause to be inflicted, reasonable corporal
punishment upon a pupil attending such school whenever such punishment is reasonably
necessary in order to preserve discipline while such pupil is subject to school authority.
[Vol. 11:2
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constitutional and the eighth amendment was not applicable in a civil con-
text. 5
A federal court in Vermont came to the same conclusion in a similar
case, Gonway v. Gray,36 involving two twelve year old students who were
allegedly subjected to corporal punishment while attending public school.
Gonway alleged in his complaint that he had been punished by the defendant
Gray, the principal, by the application of several strokes of a belt to his
buttocks, after he admitted sending a "dirty note" to a classmate; and Ladue
alleged that a mathematics instructor struck him across the face when he
questioned a disciplinary decision made by the instructor. 7 Again, the court
held that neither the eighth amendment nor fourteenth amendment had been
violated. Just as in Sims, the court felt that the eighth amendment provided
a limitation against penalties for criminal behavior and thus was not appli-
cable in the school setting. As to the fourteenth amendment, they held that
the Vermont statute which authorized teachers and other school officials to
resort to any reasonable punishment, including corporal punishment, in
order to maintain discipline in the schools, did not violate the fourteenth
amendment's due process requirement.3 The court also found that the "use
of moderate force may be sanctioned to secure important state interests,"
and that "'liberty' as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment does not
guarantee the freedom of a school child from the reasonable imposition of
school discipline." 9
The third type of situation, in which courts have held that the eighth
amendment might apply if the punishment involved were severe enough,
was exemplified in the North Carolina case of Baker v. Owen."° In this case,
a three-judge court considered the claims of a sixth grade boy and his mother
that their constitutional rights had been violated when the boy was punished
by his teacher over his mother's objections and without procedural due process.
The mother alleged that her rights to discipline her child had been violated,
and the boy claimed that the circumstances under which the punishment had
been administered denied him procedural due process and that the punish-
ment inflicted was cruel and unusual."' Here, too, the plaintiffs were challeng-
ing the constitutionality of a state statute specifically authorizing such
35 388 F. Supp. at 544.
38 361 F. Supp. 366 (D. Vt. 1973).
37 Id. at 367.
88 Id.
99 Id. at 369.
40395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C.), a/I'd without comment, 423 U.S. 907 (1975).
41 Id. at 296,
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punishment."2 The court decided that Mrs. Baker's claims did not involve
fundamental rights and that the state's interest in maintaining order in
schools prevailed over the parents' interest in deciding how their children
should be disciplined."' Also they held, without really considering the eighth
amendment issue, that in this case the punishment was not cruel and
unusual."
More attention was given by the court to the fourteenth amendment
claim of violation of due process. The court first found that a student has
a constitutional right in avoiding unnecessary or arbitrary corporal punish-
ment based on the expansive nature of the fourteenth amendment's concept
of liberty." Having decided this, they then considered what procedural safe-
guards should be followed to protect the child's "liberty interest."" They
agreed with the state's assertion that elaborate time-consuming procedures,
such as formal notice and right to counsel before infliction of corporal
punishment would destroy its value, as "the essence of corporal punishment
is swift and tangible wages for one's transgression. 4 7 However, they did
hold that certain minimal procedures should be required, and since the
statute did not provide these, the court suggested inclusion of three require-
ments: (1) notice to the student, (2) administraion of the punishment in
the presence of a second official, and (3) explanation to the parents upon
request.
The Baker court relied upon the Supreme Court decision of Goss v.
Lopez," in which a state statute which gave school authorities power to sus-
pend pupils without requiring procedural safeguards had been challenged. 9
'- N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-146 (1975) reads as follows:
Duties of teachers generally; principals and teachers may use reasonable force in
exercising lawful authority. - It shall be the duty of all teachers, including student
teachers, substitute teachers, voluntary teachers, teachers' aides and assistants when
given authority over some part of the school program by the 1irincipal or supervising
teacher, to maintain good order and discipline in their respective schools .... Teachers
shall cooperate with the principal in ascertaining the cause of nonattendance of pupils
that he may report all violators of the compulsory attendance law to the attendance
officer in accordance with rules promulgated by the State Board of Education.
Principals, teachers, substitute teachers, voluntary teachers, teachers' aides and assistants
and student teachers in the public schools of this State may use reasonable force in
the exercise of lawful authority to restrain or correct pupils and maintain order. No
county or city board of education or district committee shall promulgate or continue
in effect a rule, regulation or bylaw which prohibits the use of such force as is
specified in this section.
43 395 F. Supp. at 299-300.
44 Id. at 296.
45 Id. at 301.
46 Id. at 302.
47 Id.
48 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
49 Owo REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.66 (Page 1972).
[Vol. 11:2
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The Supreme Court recognized that a suspension record "could seriously
damage the student's standing with their fellow pupils and their teachers as
well as interfere with later opportunities for higher education and employ-
ment."5 In determining what procedural protections would be necessary
before suspension from school could be imposed, the Court considered the
state's interest in maintaining discipline and order in the schools without
being required to undertake complex and burdensome procedures, against
the student's interest in having adequate procedural protections to avoid
arbitrary punishment.5' The Court held that although the state's interest
must be protected, procedural due process requires that the student be given
"some kind of notice and . . . some kind of hearing."" Goss then, requires
that for suspensions, the student must have oral or written notice of the
charges and an opportunity to present his version of the incident.
These decisions, therefore, led to the case of Ingraham v. Wright which
raised the issue of substantive due process, as well as the issues previously
raised of cruel and unusual punishment and procedural due process, in
corporal punishment situations. In addition to the Florida statute involved
in this controversy,55 a school board policy regulation was challenged.5"
Three constitutional arguments were advanced: first, plaintiffs claimed that
the punishment inflicted was cruel and unusual in violation of the eighth
amendment of the Constitution; second, they claimed corporal punishment
is unrelated to achieving any legitimate educational goal and thus violates
substantive due process by depriving students of liberty arbitrarily and
capriciously; and third, they claimed that they were deprived of fourteenth
amendment guarantees of procedural due process."5
The district court heard evidence only on count three, the equitable
claim, and at the close of plaintiffs case following a week-long trial, the
parties agreed to consider the evidence offered on count three as if it had
been offered on counts one and two for purposes of a motion for directed
verdict. The district court then dismissed all three counts.5 A panel of the
court of appeals voted to reverse concluding that the punishment was so
50 419 U.S. at 575.
51 Id. at 581.
52 Id.
5 3 Supra note 9.
54 Dade County School Board Policy 5144, cited in 97 S. Ct. at 1405 n.7, authorized
corporal punishment when it was determined by the principal that it was necessary because
of the failure of other means to secure the student's cooperation. It required that the student
should understand the seriousness of the offense and the reason for the punishment and
also required the presence of another adult as a witness.
55 Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909, 912 (5th Cir. 1976).
56 Id.
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harsh and severe as to violate the eighth and fourteenth amendments.5"
However, on rehearing, the en banc court reversed the panel and affirmed
the decision of the district court." The opinion of the majority in regard to
the eighth amendment claim stated that it does not apply to the infliction
of corporal punishment on public school children by public school teachers
and administrators. The court considered at great length the legislative
history of the eighth amendment and decided that the prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment was meant to be applied in the criminal rather
than the civil context, and the court felt that it was not necessary to expand
the scope of the eighth amendment to include corporal punishment in schools.
They commented that if excessive force had been used, the remedy lay in
a criminal or civil tort action and not federal constitutional law.59 In a
footnote, the court remarked on the differences between criminals and
school children, saying, "[tihe much greater access of school children
through their parents to public opinion and to the political process, in
addition to the natural restraint that generally exists when one strikes a
child, deters excessive conduct by the school official.""0
The second issue presented to the court involved substantive due pro-
cess which has been defined as "freedom from arbitrary and unreasonable
legislative action."'" Generally, courts have agreed that authorization of
corporal punishment is neither unreasonable nor unrelated to any legitimate
legislative goal of education. 2 In dealing with this issue, the Fifth Circuit
Court decided that maintenance of discipline to achieve an effective learning
atmosphere was a "proper object for state and local school board regula-
tions" 3 and as long as the regulation bears a reasonable relation to the
"legitimate end of maintaining an atmosphere conducive to learning" it does
not violate substantive due process."
On the third constitutional question, the procedural due process issue,
the court ruled that infliction of a paddling on a school child was not such
a grievous loss that procedural protections were due. They distinguished
the protections required in Goss and Baker and stated:
We refuse to set forth, as constitutionally mandated, procedural stan-
dards for an activity which is not substantial enough, on a constitu-
57 498 F.2d 248 (1974).
58 525 F.2d at 909.
5
9 Id. at 915.
6Oid. at 915 n.5.
6 1 See Note, 45 U. CN. L. R~v. 500, 501 n.14 (1976).
621d. at 501.
63 525 F.2d at 916.
64 Id. at 917,
(Vol. 11:2
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tional level, to justify the time and effort which would have to be
expended by the school in adhering to these procedures or to justify
further interference by federal courts into the internal affairs of public
schools.6 5
As a result of the decision of the court of appeals, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari 6 to hear the case, but limited its review to the questions
of cruel and unusual punishment and procedural due process. The Court
agreed with the Fifth Circuit judges that the eighth amendment does not
apply to the use of corporal punishment to enforce discipline in public
schools."7 They followed the Fifth Circuit's rationale that the eighth amend-
ment was intended for protection of criminals and held that school children
do not need such protection since the public school is an
open institution . . . . Even while at school, the child brings with him
the support of family and friends and is rarely apart from teachers and
other pupils who may witness and protest any instances of mistreatment.
The openness of the public school and its supervision by the com-
munity afford significant safeguards against the kinds of abuses from
which the Eighth Amendment protects the prisoner .... Teachers and
administrators are privileged at common law to inflict only such corporal
punishment as is reasonably necessary for proper education and dis-
cipline of the child; any punishment going beyond the privilege may
result in both civil and criminal liability. As long as the schools are
open to public scrutiny, . . . common law restraints . .. [should] effec-
tively remedy and deter excesses ....
The court then considered the issue concerning the fourteenth amend-
ment due process protection. Since the fourteenth amendment prohibits any
state from depriving a citizen of life, liberty or property without due process
of law, the first question the Court considered was whether the interests of
the plaintiff were within the realm of the protected interests. The Court
also considered what procedures would constitute "due process" ' and con-
cluded that although a pupil's interest in avoiding corporal punishment in
school was a constitutionally protected interest, "traditional common law
remedies are fully adequate to afford due process.""0 They used a balancing
technique between the child's interest in not being subjected to corporal
punishment and the traditional view that corporal punishment may be neces-
sary. As a result, the majority determined that there was no "deprivation of
651d. at 919.
66425 U.S. 990 (1976).
67 97 S. Ct. at 1409.
68 Id. at 1412.
69Id. at 1413.
70 Id.
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substantive rights as long as disciplinary corporal punishment is within the
limits of common law privilege."7'
In discussing advance procedural safeguards, the Court considered the
impracticability of imposing a rule of procedural due process governing
corporal punishment and felt it would be a significant burden on the use of
corporal punishment which might eliminate its effectiveness when most
needed. Also, if corporal punishment in schools were to be abolished, it
would be the duty of the community and the legislature to do so, not the
function of the Supreme Court to intrude into the region which is primarily
an educational responsibility."
It has been recognized that discipline is the foremost problem in schools
today."' Students and teachers feel threatened and misconduct ranges from
the trivial to the very serious. As students' rights have become a reality,
teachers seem to have decreasing authority over them, and thus the conflict
which arises leads to more disorder and less education. Parents have become
disturbed and feel that the schools are failing to function effectively, while
teachers and administrators hesitate to take firm disciplinary measures in
light of the uncertainty of the law with respect to students' rights." The state
of the law prior to Ingraham, because of its indefiniteness, gave no guide-
lines to school administrators in establishing acceptable disciplinary programs.
The trend toward more interference" with the school's internal policies
caused discipline to deteriorate steadily, in part due to the reluctance of
school authorities to face a suit if they had misread the tenor of the times."6
The decision in Goss v. Lopez indicated that many schools needed to
review and revamp their suspension and expulsion policies to provide the
procedural safeguards mandated. As to corporal punishment, the Supreme
Court pointed out that even informal hearings are time-consuming and
divert school personnel from educational activities." Thus, if corporal punish-
ment is to be effective, it must be administered quickly. Required prior
hearings would discourage most teachers from using corporal punishment
when it would be perhaps the most suitable disciplinary action available to
the teacher at that time. As the Court pointed out, those teachers most likely
1 ld. at 1415.
72 Id. at 1416.
T3 Note, 11 WAKE FOReS L. REv. 703 (1975).
T4 Id.
15 See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393
U.S. 503 (1969); Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C. 1975).
76 11 WAKE FoREsT, supra note 73, at 703.
77 97 S. Ct. at 1417.
(Vol. 11:2
10
Akron Law Review, Vol. 11 [1978], Iss. 2, Art. 7
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol11/iss2/7
RECENT CASES
to be deterred from using corporal punishment would be the ones least
likely to abuse the common law privilege."8
Although Ingraham proclaims that corporal punishment in schools is
not violative of the eighth or fourteenth amendments, it also indicates that
such punishment must be that which is authorized and limited by the
common law."' While the Supreme Court did not feel the necessity to
delineate the common law safeguards, it would seem to be in the best
interests of school districts and their students to elaborate on these safe-
guards. By requiring personnel to follow certain procedures in administering
corporal punishment, protection could be afforded to pupils from unwar-
ranted punishment and to teachers from unwanted lawsuits.
As Justice Powell pointed out in the majority opinion, school authorities
remain liable for damages to the child for any excessive punishment inflicted
and, if malice is present and proved, they may be criminally liable."0
Generally, school districts are protected under the doctrine of sovereign
immunity,8 1 but the situation is changing since many states, including Ohio,
have waived this immunity. 2 It is unlikely, however, that schools will dras-
tically change their discipline policies to increase the use of corporal punish-
ment. Nonetheless, this decision is somewhat of a victory for school officials
since it seems to reinforce their authority and may help to uphold discipline
in today's schools.
It appears that the only recourse now available to students and parents
objecting to corporal punishment would be claims based on common law
standards, as corporal punishment per se is not unconstitutional. Although
the issue of substantive due process was not considered by the Supreme
Court, courts generally have agreed with the Fifth Circuit's holding that
authorization of corporal punishment is not unreasonable, nor is it unrelated
to legitimate educational goals.8" Since no legislative misconduct is evident in
enacting statutes authorizing corporal punishment, the argument that corporal
punishment violates substantive due process does not seem to be a viable one.,"
In states which have not statutorily authorized corporal punishment,
parents unwilling to have their children subjected to corporal punishment
for disobeying school regulations may be able to attack the system by using
78 Id.
T9 Id. at 1418.
SOld. at 1415.
81 See Vacca, Teacher Malpractice, 8 U. RICH. L. REv. 477, (1974).
82 See Ripps, supra note 21, at 20.
8s See 45 CN., supra note 61, at 501.
81 Id. at 505.
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an argument based on the underlying theory of corporal punishment; that is,
the doctrine of in loco parentis. Their specific argument must be that since
the teachers are standing in place of the parents, and since the parents have
not authorized the particular form of punishment being used, the teachers
do not have the privilege of inflicting such punishment.
"It appears to be well established, that the parents of school children
have a fundamental right to bring up their offspring according to their own
precepts and convictions."85 This concept was first recognized by the Supreme
Court over fifty years ago in Meyer v. Nebraska." There the Court described
the components of liberty protected by the fourteenth amendment in the
following way: "Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily
restraint but also the right of the individual to... marry, establish a home
and bring up children .... -", In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court
upheld the rights of parents to raise their children unencumbered by the
state, and stated: "The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty,
to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."" In still another
case, Prince v. Massachusetts, the Court said:
It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child
reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.
And it is in recognition of this that these decisions have respected the
private realm of family life .... 19
More recent cases have also continued to uphold the integrity of family life
and have considered the right of a parent to raise his children to be a basic
civil right of man."0
One federal district court held that the fundamental rights of a parent
to raise his children without the use of corporal punishment were greater than
the interest of the school in inflicting such punishment when the parent had
previously denied his consent."' Thus, absent a parental consent form, a
teacher could not inflict corporal punishment on a child in a district which
follows this holding without subjecting the school to legal action for trespass-
ing on the basic right of parents to bring up their children as they see fit."
85 26 BAYLOR, supra note 12, at 679.
86262 U.S. 390 (1923).
97 ld. at 399.
88 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
89 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
90 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
91 Glaser v. Marietta, 351 F. Supp. 555 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
"2 See BAYLOR, supra note 12, at 681.
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RECENT CASES
Another factor, however, must be taken into consideration while evaluat-
ing the arguments expressed above and that is the interest of the state in
maintaining discipline and order in the schools. It was noted by the Court in
Prince that: "[t]he family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest
as against a claim of ... liberty. Acting to guard the genuine interest in
youth's well being, the state ... may restrict the parent's control by requiring
school attendance .... .
In Baker v. Owen, the school presented a strong argument against a
parent's contention that the right to determine how his child is to be dis-
ciplined is a fundamental one, and one which may not be violated. The
court rejected Mrs. Baker's suggestion that this right was fundamental, saying:
We do not read Meyer and Pierce to enshrine parental rights so high
in the hierarchy, of constitutional values. In each case the parental
right prevailed not because the Court termed it fundamental and the
state's interest uncompelling, but because the Court considered the
state's action to be arbitrary, without reasonable relation to an end
legitimately within its power. "
Although the Supreme Court might someday decide to provide parental
rights "the highest degree of constitutional protection" by deciding that they
are "implicit" in the concept of liberty in the fourteenth amendment, the
Court stated that "reason and common sense" prevented them from making
that decision." The Baker Court distinguished Meyer and Pierce by showing
that those cases involved a parental concern which was venerable, one that
was "worthy of great deference due to its unquestioned acceptance throughout
our history."99 Mrs. Baker's contention, on the other hand, was held by the
Court to conflict with the settled tradition of approving corporal punishment
as long as it was reasonable. Since Baker has been affirmed by the Supreme
Court, it would seem that the Court is not likely to consider a parent's
approval as being a fundamental right; in fact, the Court mentions in a foot-
note in Ingraham that "parental approval of corporal punishment is not con-
stitutionally required.""
It appears that concerned parents would be best advised to focus their
efforts on state legislatures and local school boards to manifest their dis-
pleasure with corporal punishment of school children. Since both are elective
bodies, a concerted effort by parents to ensure that necessary safeguards are
provided before corporal punishment is inflicted should produce satisfactory
93 321 U.S. at 166.
94 395 F. Supp. at 299.
951d.
96 Id. at 300.
9' 97 S. Ct. at 1408 n.22.
Fall, 1977]
13
Altier: Ingraham v. Wright
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1978
AKRON LAw REVIEW
results and have the added advantage of keeping control of the schools as
local as possible. 8 Finally, students who feel they have been unjustly and
excessively punished can resort to the courts for redress in a civil tort
action, or if malice was present and can be proved, a criminal action. It
remains to be seen, however, whether these judicial safeguards will suffi-
ciently deter the use of unreasonable corporal punishment.
Although the Court did not mandate specific procedural safeguards to
be followed, it is likely that most school districts will establish them on
their own initiative or under pressure from concerned parents. Alternatively,
state legislatures may prescribe certain procedures to be followed whenever
corporal punishment is inflicted. Since the Supreme Court has seen fit to
trust the school personnel with the privilege of inflicting corporal punishment
when necessary, it behooves the school personnel to make certain that it is
administered fairly and justly, within the common law standards of reason-
ableness and necessity.
MARY W. ALTIER
98 Many school districts have already adopted safeguards. E.g., Cuyahoga Falls School
District, Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio, Handbook of Policies and Procedures states:
IV. Corporal Punishment
A. Corporal punishment shall be administered only after the behavior in question
has been discussed with the student and he/she has had an opportunity to
explain his/her behavior.
B. Corporal punishment is not to be administered in anger and only after suitable
warning has been given.
C. Corporal punishment is not to be administered publicly or in the view of
other students.
D. The principal or assistant/unit principal shall be present when corporal
punishment is inflicted. If the unit principal administers the punishment, the
principal shall be notified.
E. Such punishment shall not be excessive and shall not be inflicted above the
shoulders of the student.
F. Notification of such punishment shall be made in writing to the Superin-
tendent of schools, together with a description of the reason or reasons
therefore.
G. Parents shall be notified when it has been necessary to administer corporal
punishment. Such notification may be by telephone or by mail.
Handbook of Policies and Procedures § 415.10 (IV), Cuyahoga Falls City School District,
Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio.
Section 415.10 (IV) then spells out a list of specific offenses which may lead to penalties
which may include corporal punishment and provides that if additional offenses are put
on the list, the students must be informed.
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